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Abstract: The present article focused on the problem of validity, reliability and specificity of psychiatric diagnoses. 
The authors moved by the concept of syndrome, defined by Sydenham in the 18th century as a constellation of several  
interrelated symptoms, showing a stable, characteristic structure and a peculiar prognosis, in order to analyse the peculiar-
ity of the current psychiatric nosology.  In our opinion, the current nosographic system based on DSM-IV criteria, pre-
vents psychiatry from benefiting of the significant technological progress that has led the rest of medical sciences to im-
portant clinical achievements in the last 20 years. The case of Generalized Anxiety Disorder was taken as an example of a 
disease characterized by unstable diagnostic criteria, high rate of comorbidity and uncertain boundaries. An analysis of the 
data from the Sesto Fiorentino study was performed to investigate the presence of common mood and anxiety symptoms 
across the most represented DSM IV diagnoses, in order to evaluate the specificity of these symptoms. 
The results supported the hypothesis of a low specificity of these symptoms, suggesting the need for psychiatry to find 
new and more specific markers and instruments.  
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1. THE CONCEPT OF SYNDROME IN PSYCHIATRY 
The concept of syndrome is relatively recent. Most of the 
schools of medicine of the ancient world considered every 
single symptom and sign as a separate disease itself [1]. In 
1742, Sydenham was the first scientist to clearly formulate 
the minimum requirements needed to define a clinical condi-
tion as a syndrome. In his definition, a syndrome consists of 
several interrelated symptoms showing a stable, characteris-
tic structure and a peculiar prognosis [2]. Furthermore, pa-
tients affected by a specific syndrome should share a suffi-
ciently pathognomonic cluster of symptoms that allows cli-
nicians to distinguish them from other patients suffering 
from different syndromes. Such fundamental elements of 
discontinuity among various syndromes were, at first, better 
conceptualized by Sneath [3], who introduced the term of 
"point of rarity” to refer to precise clinical boundaries among 
disorders, and were later revised by Kendell and Jablensky 
[4], who preferred the concept of “zone of rarity” separating 
psychiatric syndromes. The idea was that if a syndrome cor-
responds to a natural entity, than we should find a natural 
boundary or a discontinuity between this condition and its 
clinical “neighbours” [5]; in other terms, mixed conditions 
can exist, but they have to be less common than the pure 
syndromal form.  
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Several authors [i.e. 1, 2, 6] have investigated whether 
such a theoretical construct could be applied to the field of 
mental disorders. In spite of the improvement in this field, 
the validity of the actual classifications (ICD-10 [7], DSM-
IV-TR [8]) still remains a matter of debate. Although formal 
criteria to establish the validity of psychiatric diagnoses have 
been progressively proposed (i.e., descriptive features, so-
ciodemographic factors, laboratory markers, exclusion crite-
ria, neurobiologic and genetic validators, prognostic charac-
teristics, level of functional and social disability, response to 
therapy, statistical deviation from the healthy condition, etc.) 
[9-11], in a clinical framework some of the conditions that 
are currently classified as psychiatric disorders still appear as 
vague and confusing (rather than discrete) entities. In par-
ticular, most of them show weak diagnostic criteria (low 
association between diagnostic symptoms and actual diagno-
sis), unspecific manifestations (poorly pathognomonic symp-
toms), and widespread onset (high comorbidity). 
2. AN EXAMPLE OF THE UNSTABLE DIAGNOSTIC 
CRITERIA IN PSYCHIATRY: THE GENERALIZED 
ANXIETY DISORDER 
According to the mentioned Sydenham’s definition of 
syndrome, a first anomaly has to be taken into account: sev-
eral diagnostic categories changed their criteria in different 
DSM editions and some of them were abolished, merged 
with other conditions, or divided into two or more entities. 
GAD was first introduced as a unique diagnosis in the third 
edition of the DSM (DSM-III) [12], but it was most often 
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diagnostic criteria for another anxiety disorder [13]. Consid-
ering the difficulty to discriminate between GAD and other 
disorders [14-15], the definition of GAD and the associated 
symptoms were substantially revised in the further edition of 
DSM. As a consequence, the DSM-IV-TR [8] considered 
GAD as an independent diagnosis among the anxiety disor-
ders, characterized by “excessive, uncontrollable worry 
about a variety of topics that occurs more days than not for a 
period of at least six months”. The worry causes distress 
and/or functional impairment, and is associated with at least 
three of the following features: restlessness or feeling keyed 
up or on edge, being easily fatigued, difficulty concentrating 
or mind going blank, irritability, muscle tension, and sleep 
disturbance (difficulty falling or staying asleep, or restless 
unsatisfying sleep) [8]. Indeed, four out of the six associated 
physical symptoms of GAD (i.e. restlessness, fatigue, diffi-
culty concentrating, sleep difficulties, obsessive rumination, 
somatization) are also part of the diagnostic criteria for Ma-
jor Depressive Disorder [16, 17]. Furthermore, symptoms 
required for GAD diagnosis are also present in other anxiety 
disorders, as closer overlaps probably exist between GAD 
and Panic Disorder or Social Anxiety Disorder [18]. 
In general the nosographic ambiguity - which is related to 
different psychiatric diagnoses - makes it very hard to define 
a stable constellation of interrelating symptoms and to char-
acterize a specific population of patients with a specific di-
agnosis. The uncertain psychopathologic boundary of many 
psychiatric conditions seems to further move these disorders 
away from the original definition of discrete syndromes.  
3. THE PROBLEM OF COMORBIDITY 
The psychiatric comorbidity – defined as co-occurrence 
of two or more psychiatric diagnoses in the same patient – 
raised a significant concern in the debate on the categoriza-
tion of psychiatric disorders. The concept of comorbidity 
was first introduced by Feinstein [19] to denote those cases 
in which a ‘distinct additional clinical entity’ occurred dur-
ing the clinical course of a patient having an index disease. 
This concept was recently used to indicate not only those 
cases in which a patient receives both a psychiatric and a 
general medical diagnosis, but also those cases in which two 
or more psychiatric diagnoses are present in the same patient 
[20]. The lack of well-defined and specific symptoms for 
many disorders and the high rates of GAD comorbidity with 
other anxiety and mood disorders make it difficult for the 
clinician to perform a reliable differential diagnosis and to 
correctly identify this condition [18, 21]. Moreover, neurotic 
symptoms appear to be more frequent in mixed or associated 
forms than as parts of pure conditions. Again, the high rate 
for GAD comorbidity was considered to challenge the valid-
ity of this diagnosis. The different revisions of DSM criteria 
for GAD did not solve the matter of comorbidity, and its 
high rates of co-occurrence with other anxiety or mood dis-
order are still widely reported [13, 22-27]. 
4. SYMPTOMS OVERLAP: EXPERIMENTAL DATA 
FROM THE SESTO FIORENTINO STUDY 
To support the concerns raised above, we performed fur-
ther analyses of the data from the Sesto Fiorentino Study, a 
large community study, which has been described in detail 
elsewhere [28]. The main feature of this study is that psychi-
atric symptoms are assessed “bottom up”, i.e. regardless of 
the diagnosis: diagnostic categories are built up later, by 
computerized algorithms. There are several advantages of 
focusing on symptoms rather than diagnoses. Such an ap-
proach does not depend on pre-constructed nosological theo-
ries, allows the analysis of natural aggregations of symptoms 
even below their diagnostic cutoff points [29], permits the 
comparison of the qualitative and quantitative aspects [30], 
and can be useful to investigate specificity of diagnostic 
symptoms.  
We evaluated the presence of some common mood and 
anxiety symptoms across the most represented DSM IV di-
agnoses (Fig. 1). It is clear that these symptoms occur trans-
versally in a variety of diagnostic categories, with little 
variations from each other. As far as the GAD symptoms are 
concerned, a further analysis was performed on the data from 
the Sesto Fiorentino study: we tested for significant differ-
ences in each of the GAD symptom reported in Fig. (1), 
across diagnostic categories. This analysis generally con-
firmed the lack of specificity of the reported symptoms.  
These results confirmed that the symptoms which are re-
quired for a diagnosis of Major Depressive Episode or Gen-
eralized Anxiety Disorder are essentially non-specific.  
Moreover, symptoms tend to be considered as “stand 
alone”, independently of the presence of other symptoms, 
whereas in the clinical practice the co-occurrence of other 
symptoms may consistently modify the interpretation of the 
clinical presentation. Suicidal thoughts accompanied by de-
lusions of guilt are considered potentially more dangerous 
than suicidal ideation plus hystrionic features.  
The application of the categorical model in psychiatry is 
likely to be different from the one used in other medical sci-
ences. In general medicine, symptoms are considered either 
non-specific (fever or fatigue may be taken as an example), 
or specific (such as the aspect of blisters in HZV infection). 
In medicine we do not count symptoms in order to make a 
diagnosis: peritonitis and flu may share some symptoms, for 
example fever, pallor or fatigue (non-specific), but they can-
not be used to make up the diagnosis of peritonitis with a 
comorbid flu, and in any case if a peritonitis is present, none 
 
Fig. (1). Occurrence of specific symptoms across different   
diagnoses. 
Vertical Axis reports percentage of occurrence of the symptoms 
according to different diagnoses.  
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would assign the same value to the symptom “fatigue” and to 
the one “abdominal guarding exacerbated by moving perito-
neum”. 
DSM-III and its successors, became universally and un-
critically accepted as the ultimate authority on psychopa-
thology and diagnosis. DSM forms the basis for psychiatric 
teaching to both residents and undergraduates. Although it 
represents an undoubted progress for reliability and commu-
nication between clinicians and researchers, the price that 
psychiatry had to pay for these benefits is very high: the di-
agnostic process lost out in terms of sophistication and speci-
ficity.  
According to Andreasen [30], our data demonstrated that 
diagnostic criteria include only some characteristic symp-
toms of a given disorder but they were never intended to 
provide a comprehensive description.  
Validity has been sacrificed to achieve reliability. DSM 
diagnoses have given researchers a common nomenclature - 
but probably the wrong one. Although creating standardized 
diagnoses that would facilitate research was a major goal, 
DSM diagnoses are not useful for research because of their 
lack of validity. Since the core features of mental illness 
were mainly unknown, both the symptom pattern and the 
prognostic value (e.g. duration, course and severity) of psy-
chiatric syndromes were defined arbitrarily and convention-
ally. Many examples can be mentioned to support this idea, 
ranging from the scarce agreement between DSM/ICD clas-
sification systems [31, 32] to the lack of validity of schizo-
phrenia subtypes [33] and the problems inherent in the diag-
nosis of some psychiatric disorders (i.e. schizoaffective dis-
order) [34, 35]. Therefore, the validity of the present 
nosology has never been sufficiently demonstrated. On the 
contrary, the premise that original DSM diagnostic catego-
ries are primarily artificial and have no confirmed value of 
elementary clinical entities, is usually forgotten. This short-
ness of memory can push psychiatrists to think that 
DSM/ICD diagnoses are natural categorical entities (a phe-
nomenon that Van Praag called “nosologomania”), thus 
making them accept unconditionally and uncritically the 
current classification system and ignore alternative models 
[36]. Many authors believe that this might represent a rather 
blind approach that may be either dangerous or useless in 
terms of application in biological and psychopharmacologi-
cal research. In fact, most of the available scientific studies 
are actually based on the current arbitrary classification, even 
if it may not match with the correspondent biological and 
clinical sources. On the other hand, studies based on the so-
called dimensional approach to psychopathology [37-39] 
show a relative aspecificity of diagnostic categories and pro-
vide robust examples of usefulness of reasoning, in terms of 
symptom clusters.  
In our opinion, the current nosographic system prevents 
psychiatry from benefiting of the significant technological 
progress that has led the rest of medical sciences to impor-
tant clinical achievements in the last 20 years. In the future, 
psychiatry will be probably able to find new and more spe-
cific markers and instruments [40, 41].  
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